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Abstract
This article tries to clarify Government behaviours as to 
how to manage aid in Tanzania. Contrary to the 
Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
donor intentions, the development aid structure, carefully 
constructed under the poverty reduction regime in 
Tanzania, has led to Tanzanian- owned initiatives toward a 
national development plan (NDP). Furthermore, this arti-
cle shows that, in the process of creating an international 
development aid system, the Tanzanian Government has 
learned to manage aid in a recipient- driven manner not 
only from DAC donors, but also from China.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Due to the high aid dependency and the Government’s “weak capacity” and weak “political will” for 
the development goals, aid has been characterized as “donor- driven ownership,” meaning that donors 
lead the aid relationship and manage aid (Bergamaschi, 2009). The core problems with “donor- driven 
ownership” can be identified as a lack of good policy and “project fragmentation.” As Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Pritchett (1998) emphasized, aid effectiveness depends on good pol-
icy, and the importance of a common development plan with “political will” cannot be overempha-
sized. On the other hand, “project fragmentation” was described in the statement by the Organisation 
for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) Chairman and the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) Chairman at the 2005 High- Level Forum in Paris. According to this statement, 
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there are more than 60,000 aid projects in recipient countries, and the donor- led approach in those 
projects reduces the impact of development aid, both by imposing different implementation processes 
determined by each donor, and also by obstructing efforts on the part of recipient countries to build 
their own implementation systems.
Against this background, aid management became one of the central issues for aid effectiveness, 
and the Paris Declaration was adopted to enhance aid effectiveness through effective aid management 
by both donors and recipient countries (Abdel- Malek, 2015). There are five principles of the decla-
ration: country ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for development results and mutual 
accountability. Since the Paris Declaration emphasized the importance of country ownership, with the 
recipient country formulating a common development plan for the recipient country and donors and 
manage aid with the principles of harmonization and alignment under the common plan. Therefore, 
effective aid management shall be assessed by how the recipient country manages aid under the com-
mon development plan. When the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris Declaration 
were agreed, aid was dominated by DAC donors, especially in sub- Saharan African countries, so that 
aid management was focused mainly on aid from DAC donors. However, subsequently the expanding 
presence of emerging donors, in particular China, has attracted the interest of the international aid 
community in recent years.
In addition, since the new era for international development might be said to have started in 2016 
as Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from MDGs, with their expectation of broader actor en-
gagement, incorporating private entities, emerging donors and so forth that could provide further re-
sources, it is crucial to learn how the recipient countries have managed the international development 
aid, including aid from China, in the MDG era.
In the literature, there is a gap when it comes to dealing with the dynamics of managing aid from 
the perspective of donors and recipient countries. There is a tendency to discuss aid management from 
the donor perspective; however, focusing on one side cannot provide a full picture of aid management. 
Therefore, this article will analyze the extent to which developing country governments are managing 
and taking in aid maximally from DAC donors and China1 under the poverty reduction regime.
Tanzania has been selected as the case study for this article. The selection criteria include the 
country’s active engagement in initiatives under the Paris Declaration and high profile of China’s aid 
in recent years (China- DAC study group 2013). Before moving to the literature review and a detailed 
analysis, this article will show that, contrary to DAC donor intentions, the aid structure, carefully 
constructed under the poverty reduction regime in Tanzania for aid management has led to Tanzanian- 
owned initiatives toward a national development plan (NDP). This has created a space for the entry 
and rapid spread of China’s aid. Furthermore, this article will show that, in the process of creating 
an aid system, the Tanzanian Government has learned to manage aid and been skilfully building 
management systems for aid resources both from DAC donors and from China in a recipient- driven 
manner. Furthermore, this article will examine how the Tanzanian Government has managed aid over 
the years.
This article is structured as follows: after a review of earlier studies, the research questions will be 
presented, followed by the hypothesis and then an explanation of the method of analysis used in this ar-
ticle. The third section proceeds to identify the way the Tanzanian Government managed DAC donors 
aid. Section 4 will explain new initiatives of the Tanzanian Government for aid management and un-
tangle the relationship between the Tanzanian Government’s own development initiative and China’s 
1It is difficult to differentiate China’s officially supported finance, including official development assistance (ODA), export 
credits and non- concessional state loans or aid used to foster Chinese investment into ODA and non- ODA, this article calls 
Chinese officially supported finance as “China’s aid.”
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aid to demonstrate how the Tanzanian Government received China’s aid correctly. Section 5 examines 
the transitions in the national planning organization relating to how the Tanzanian Government has 
managed aid over the years. Finally, the conclusion will present some of the implications based on the 
analysis mentioned above.
2 |  LITERATURE REVIEW, RESEARCH QUESTION AND 
RESEARCH METHOD
The Paris Declaration aimed to enhance aid effectiveness through aid management which was now 
to be conducted by both donors and recipient countries based on the five Paris principles. As a re-
sult of the “survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration” by the OECD, it was found that there are 
“unfinished aid effectiveness business agenda” elements, such as aid fragmentation, harmonization, 
alignment, etc. (Abdel- Malek, 2015, p. 54). Therefore, it is necessary to deal with those unfinished 
business agenda for more effective aid management.
Harmonization can refer to actions by donors for joint consultation to co- ordinate their assistance 
in terms of target recipient countries and priority sectors and to reduce the transaction costs to re-
cipient countries caused by aid fragmentation. Alignment requires that donors respect a recipient 
country’s development priorities in allocating assistance for development goals (Abdel- Malek, 2015, 
p. 54). Therefore, it is important that the recipient countries exercise effective leadership over their 
development policies and strategies, and co- ordinate development actions, which is defined as country 
ownership in the Paris Declaration.
Aid is to be managed under development policies and strategies formulated with country owner-
ship. However, aid fragmentation made aid management difficult. Aid fragmentation is one of the 
longstanding issues in the aid community (Morss, 1984; Cassen & Associates, 1994), with ample 
examples witnessed in Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Vietnam, Cambodia and so forth (Van de Walle 
& Johnston, 1996; Roodman, 2006). As Acharya, Fuzzo de Lima, and Moore (2006) point out, the 
immediate consequence of aid fragmentation is increased transaction costs on recipient governments 
in absorbing aid, followed by aid fragmentation to produce inefficiencies in development assistance 
and add to the burden of recipient countries, undermining, rather than underpinning, their administra-
tive capacity (Morss, 1984, p. 465; Kharas, 2007; Kihara, 2012). To overcome aid fragmentation for 
aid management, fragmented projects shall be aligned and harmonized for aid effectiveness (OECD, 
2005). A number of previous studies have suggested proposals to manage aid, such as further aid co- 
ordination (Acharya et al., 2006), lead donor mechanisms (Frot & Santiso, 2010) and aid competition 
to solve aid fragmentation (Steinwand, 2015). So far, the literature for aid management under the Paris 
Declaration has focused on the donor perspective, and most of those suggestions are related to donor 
behaviours. Furthermore, there is little analysis in the literature of how the recipient country exercises 
country ownership for better aid management.
On the other hand, research reports on China’s aid have started to appear, accompanied by an array 
of assessments. Engagement of China in developing countries and, in particular the expansion of aid 
to Africa, has resulted in considerable interest and some concern (Manning, 2006; Woods, 2008; 
Dreher & Fuchs, 2011; Strange et al., 2013). The research on China’s aid has recognized that it is 
having a significant impact, especially in Africa, to the degree that it is “repainting the landscape of 
international development” (Manning, 2006, p. 384), “a silent revolution, changing the rules of the 
game” (Woods, 2008, p. 1221), and “a significant challenge to the norms of international aid archi-
tecture” (Bräutigam, 2010, p. 1). Moreover, China’s aid has received mixed evaluations, ranging from 
the positive to some that are highly critical.
   | O273FURUKAWA
On the positive side, recipient countries welcome the respect for sovereignty and equality, es-
pecially amid disillusionment with DAC donors’ conditionality (Woods, 2008; Berthelemy, 2011). 
On the critical side, the many concerns expressed about unconditional aid include its obstruction 
of reforms needed in countries where governance and accountability are problems (Manning, 2006; 
Collier, 2007; Mwase, 2011; Strange et al., 2013) and that it may contribute to the worsening of 
environmental and human- rights issues (Huse et al., 2008; Strange et al., 2013). Other critiques of 
China’s aid concern the fragmentation of the aid supply (Frot & Santiso, 2010), adverse effects on the 
ownership of development projects, value for money by tied aid (Schiere, 2011), and so forth. These 
issues, resulting from the engagement of China, may lead to adverse outcomes in aid effectiveness 
and undermine African development (Samy, 2010; Berthelemy, 2011). Thus, China’s aid is regarded 
as something markedly different from the initiatives designed to raise aid effectiveness in the Paris 
Declaration.
From this perspective, this article shall examine the following: how has the Tanzanian Government 
managed aid and absorbed aid resources maximally in transforming its way of utilizing the interna-
tional aid system? For this question, contrary to the general consensus that aid has been managed 
by the “donor- driven ownership,” the hypothesis is that the Tanzanian Government has established 
its own development system to manage aid by recipient- driven ownership and has maximized aid 
resources.
The research method entailed conducting interviews in September 2010 and March 2012 with 
Tanzanian Government officials from central and local government in charge of planning/budgeting 
and aid co/ordination.2 In addition, both media- based data collection was conducted alongside the 
collection of government data and documents to improve the reliability of the information on China’s 
aid due to the following reasons.
Even though the international development community has a strong interest in China’s foreign aid, 
actual discussions on the impact of China’s foreign aid have seldom taken place due to the scarcity 
of information (Bräutigam, 2010, p. 1) and the resulting lack of accuracy (Strange et al., 2013). The 
reason for this situation is that the engagement of China in Africa has, in most cases, been discussed 
in an anecdotal manner, and accurate data on the aid flows of China has not been revealed, unlike 
DAC data (Berthelemy, 2011). While the Chinese Government finally released data on its foreign 
aid for the first time in 2011, a detailed breakdown of aid provided to specific countries has still not 
been provided.
Moreover, unlike the OECD- DAC donors, the Chinese Government does not publish details of the 
financial information at the project level for foreign aid activities (Strange et al., 2013, p. 12). In order 
to improve the reliability of the information, it was necessary to conduct both a media- based data col-
lection, and also interviews with the relevant Tanzanian Government officials and donors, as well as 
the collection of government data and documents. Therefore, while there are still some limitations in 
obtaining all the necessary information, the information gathered in this research should be sufficient 
to grasp the trends and realities of China’s aid to Tanzania.
The next section will begin with an analysis of the aid structures that DAC donors and the Tanzanian 
Government have constructed in order to verify how the Tanzanian Government manages aid under 
the poverty reduction regime.
2These include the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office Regional Administration and Local 
Government, the Ministry of Health, the Bank of Tanzania, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, the Planning Commission of 
the President’s Office, and the Ministry of Infrastructure Development, the Ministry of Transport, as well as DAC donors about 
their understanding and views of China’s aid in Tanzania.
O274 |   FURUKAWA
3 |  MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR AID UNDER THE 
POVERTY REDUCTION REGIME
The report that set out the approach for Tanzanian development aid after the end of the Cold War was 
the June 1995 Danish- led “Report of the Group of Independent Advisers on Development Cooperation 
Issues between Tanzania and Its Aid Donors,” also known as the Helleiner Report (Helleiner, Killick, 
Lipumba, Ndulu, & Svendsen, 1995). At this time, DAC donors dominated aid in Tanzania. Even 
though China has a history of more than 40 years of aid to Tanzania, China’s aid had a limited 
influence for development. Prior to the report formulation, DAC donors criticized the Tanzanian 
Government severely on grounds of corruption and Government performance. In turn, the Tanzanian 
Government expressed its dissatisfaction with the donors regarding excessive requests that were dif-
ficult to realize (President’s Office et al., 2004). Under these circumstances, DAC donors showed 
their frustration toward the Tanzanian Government by considering a freeze on all aid. As a result, the 
relationship between donors and the Government worsened (Helleiner et al., 1995).
In response to this situation, for the purpose of reviewing earlier aid and exploring ways of provid-
ing aid in the future, the Helleiner Report had a donor- driven approach. The report compiled views 
from both donors and the Tanzanian Government, covering issues such as lack of country ownership, 
dissatisfaction about the enormous transaction costs incurred during different procedures of projects, 
and so forth. After formulating the report, a mutual government–donor reform process began for a new 
aid management. The approach addressed poverty reduction and aid effectiveness and led to the for-
mulation of a “poverty reduction regime” in collaboration with the donor, the Tanzanian Government 
eventually obtained the strong justification it needed to receive donor development aid. Since DAC 
donors dominated aid and their interest was centred on reduction, aid was shifted from economic sec-
tor to social sector. The report profoundly altered the approach to aid systems centred on project aid, 
which had been the core of aid for more than 30 years since Tanzania’s independence.
Prior to the Helleiner Report, each donor concentrated on specific project aid through a separate 
interface with the relevant government ministries and agencies. The ministries and agencies needed to 
respond to each individual donor following donor- specific procedures (reporting, accounting pro-
cesses, mission support, etc.) in order to receive the project aid. Since the Helleiner Report, a sector- 
wide approach (SWAps)3 has been introduced to overcome “project fragmentation”.” The primary 
difference between this approach and the previous project aid approach is the shift from “individual 
based aid” to “collective based aid.” “Individual based aid” is the provision of project aid via a bilateral 
interface between Government and individual donor for a project selected by the donor country based 
on requests from the developing country’s government. “Collective based aid,” in SWAps, allowing the 
aid stakeholders to jointly formulate a development plan encompassing the entire sector, draw up bud-
gets, and manage, monitor and evaluate operations under the leadership of the Tanzanian Government. 
As part of this shift, the interfaces between governments and donors have expanded to cover entire 
sectors rather than individual projects. We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the management 
system for aid was changed dramatically from project- based to programme- based management.
The next major development for aid management was the introduction of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategic Paper (PRSP) and General Budget Support (GBS)4 as a new form of aid modality. It has 
3The sector- wide approach is defined as “a process in which funding for the sector, whether internal or from donors, supports 
a single policy and expenditure programme, under government leadership, and adopting common approaches across the sector” 
(Sector- Wide Approach Support Group, 2004, p. 7).
4GBS entails donor funds that are disbursed through the recipient government’s own financial management system rather than 
being earmarked for specific uses.
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expanded the policy dialogue between donors and the Tanzanian Government from specific sectors to 
all Tanzanian development activities. Furthermore, with the introduction of GBS, conditionality has 
been imposed on all PRSP- related development, and performance assessment frameworks (PAFs) 
have been built to promote and monitor the actions and outcomes expected from GBS (JICA, 2004). 
Through this process, the Ministry of Finance has obtained a hegemonic position within the Tanzanian 
Government. In this way, the main drivers of Tanzania’s poverty reduction regime became the Ministry 
of Finance on the Government side, and the GBS donors on the donor side.
The aid approach brought about by the poverty reduction regime, carefully constructed by the 
Tanzanian Government and DAC donors, has led to a mechanism in which development planning 
and budget compiling, the core processes of Tanzania’s development policy, take place within the 
interfaces between the central Government bureaucracy and donors. Furthermore, along with the 
transformation of the development aid system from “individual based aid” to “collective based 
aid” after the Helleiner Report, the Tanzanian Government was able to successfully establish a 
management system for aid. Then, Tanzania joint assistance strategy (JAS) was formulated by 
the leadership of the Tanzania Government. The purpose of JAS is to promote efforts to boost 
aid effectiveness and harmonizing the country- specific aid plans of donors through effective aid 
management. Even though countries such as Ghana, Uganda and others formulated JAS, only 
Tanzania’s JAS has been approved and signed by a national Government (with the approval of 
the National Assembly), making it an official joint statement between the Government and DAC 
donors in 2006.
In sum, the following are the main points that have been made in this section. Before China’s aid 
started to appear in recent years in Tanzania (China- DAC study group 2013), DAC donors dominated 
aid in Tanzania so that the Tanzanian Government mainly needed to manage aid from DAC donors. 
As the Helleiner Report suggested, the Tanzanian Government needed to enable an environment for 
managing its aid in accordance with the Paris Declaration, and then to formulate PRSP and the adop-
tion of SWAps, and GBS to attain poverty reductions under the MDGs, following which the JAS was 
formulated. Therefore, it follows from what has been said that the Tanzania Government successfully 
established the management system for aid. However, through the establishment of an aid manage-
ment system, the Tanzanian Government paid the price of being obliged to manage aid to concentrate 
on poverty rather than economic growth.
In the following sections, this article will examine how the Tanzanian Government manages 
China’s aid. This article will explain new initiatives of the Tanzanian Government for aid management 
and untangle the relationship between the Tanzanian Government’s own development initiative and 
China’s aid in order to demonstrate how the Tanzanian Government managed China’s aid.
4 |  THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT’S INDEPENDENT 
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE FOR MANAGING CHINA’S AID
Tanzania has been implementing Vision 20255 as its long- term development plan (President’s Office 
Planning Commission, 2014), and the PRSP, enacted in October 2000, as its medium- term develop-
ment plan. Furthermore, the JAS for Tanzania clearly states that the Government and donors shall 
move ahead with development based on a single common aid strategy.
5The overall aim of the National Vision 2025 is to transfer Tanzania from a least developing to a middle income country. This 
transfer is envisioned to turn Tanzanian economy into a strong, competitive economy that will provide improved socio- 
economic opportunities, public sector performance and environmental management.
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The Tanzanian Government has formulated PRSPs three times previously. The first PRSP (launched in 
October 2000) placed poverty reduction front and centre, but the second PRSP (the National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP), a five year plan starting from 2005 and called MKUKUTA 
in Tanzania from its Swahili acronym) emphasized growth, as its name suggests. The MKUKUTA ini-
tiative divided development challenges into three clusters: (1) growth and reduction of income poverty, 
(2) improvement of quality of life and social wellbeing, and (3) governance and accountability. The main 
difference between the first PRSP and MKUKUTA is that the first PRSP focused on poverty reduction, 
while MKUKUTA, the second PRSP, incorporated growth. The successor to MKUKUTA, MKUKUTA 
II, covering the years 2010/2011 to 2014/2015, was formally released in November 2010. While it 
maintains the three MKUKUTA clusters, MKUKUTA II is a strategy that puts more weight on poverty 
reduction through economic growth. Within the strategy, it stresses agriculture and infrastructure as 
well as promoting improvements in the delivery of social services, and the continued implementation of 
reform programmes in local government and public finance management sectors.
At the same time, it was learned in a 21 March 2011 interview with the chief economist of the 
President’s Office Planning Commission (POPC), re- established in 2008, that the Government had 
started work on formulating a Tanzanian NDP under the auspices of the Planning Commission. 
Later, in June 2011, the Government finalized the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan 2011/2012–
2015/2016 and presented the final version to donors at the end of 2011. The Minister of Finance, at the 
Annual National Development Strategy meeting in January 2012, formally declared that MKUKUTA 
was a development strategy document, whereas development plans would be carried out according to 
the Government’s Five Year Development Plan (UNDP, personal communication, March 15, 2012). 
The chief economist stressed that the development plan’s formulation process was implemented at the 
Tanzanian Government’s own initiative. Therefore, despite the existence of a shared strategy docu-
ment between the Tanzanian Government and DAC donors, the Tanzanian Government, on its own 
initiative, had created an NDP behind closed doors. This duality suggests that, although the Tanzanian 
Government appears to share the same views and ideas as DAC donors in the poverty reduction 
regime, the Government’s preferred “development” does not, in fact, necessarily match the “devel-
opment” of DAC donors. So, what caused the Tanzanian Government to exclude donors and inde-
pendently establish a new NDP without consultation?
First, in order to carry out its own preferred “development,” the Tanzanian Government might re-
quire new development resources. Even though the first PRSP placed poverty reduction front and cen-
tre in deference to the intentions of DAC donors, the second PRSP, the MKUKUTA strategy, signalled 
the Tanzanian Government’s inclination to aim for economic growth while prioritizing agriculture and 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, because of Tanzania’s high aid dependency, it was virtually impossible 
for the country to attain these economic growth aims on its own. The Tanzanian Government pointed 
out that the DAC donors had not addressed this issue adequately. From 1995, when the Helleiner 
Report came out, to 2006, when the JAS for Tanzania was established, there was a huge shift in aid 
from the manufacturing sector and economic infrastructure, which had been the main areas of aid, to 
the social services sectors, which became the predominant areas of development aid. Development 
aid to the manufacturing sector and economic infrastructure, which contribute to economic growth, 
languished during this period. But from 2008, with the establishment of the POPC, there was again an 
upward trend in development aid flowing into economic infrastructure.
Secondly, while the Tanzanian Government may require new development resources for its pre-
ferred development approach, it should be assumed that the Government needs to maintain the re-
lationship with DAC donors without reducing their support at the same time. Figure 1 shows the 
situation between the shortfalls in recurrent expenditures necessary to run the country from domestic 
revenues, and GBS. As can be seen in Figure 1, GBS is crucial for covering the recurrent costs; 
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however, since the introduction of GBS, the Government has been able to cover, albeit gradually, 
shortfalls in recurrent expenditures, which include GBS. In this way, the Government has arranged 
conditions whereby surpluses can be funnelled into development budgets, though again, on an in-
cremental basis. Nevertheless, DAC donors, including GBS, have been indispensable in Tanzanian 
development.
In short, in order to realize its preferred development approach, it was necessary for the Tanzanian 
Government to obtain new development resources for growth in a justifiable manner while maintain-
ing a good relationship with DAC donors. Under these circumstances, in the field of economic growth, 
the rising presence of China at a time when DAC donors were concentrating their development aid in 
the social services sectors is very important.
Given these points, it should be possible to verify, through an analysis of China’s role in the Five 
Year Development Plan, which is part of Tanzania’s NDP, whether the Tanzanian Government’s pre-
ferred development approach is at odds with the approach preferred by DAC donors.
Recent China’s aid to Tanzania, which is based on China–Tanzania technical agreements in April 
2008, primarily functions in the three initiative areas of deployment of medical teams, human resource 
aid and public works projects. Through interviews with Tanzanian Government officials and the staff 
of DAC donors, it has become clear that China has participated neither in donor meetings nor gov-
ernment–donor meetings, and has not shared the information about its aid with DAC donors. These 
behaviours suggest that that China does not follow the JAS for Tanzania. Then, what is the role of 
China within the Tanzanian Government’s latest development framework?
The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan is a strategy to unleash Tanzania’s latent growth poten-
tial. At the core of the plan are five priority areas, namely: (1) infrastructure—particularly energy and 
transportation infrastructure (ports, railways, highways, and air transportation) through large- scale 
F I G U R E  1  Recurrent expenditure shortfalls, GBS (%) and ratio of GBS transferrable to development. 
Source: Created by the author from the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs’ budget speeches.
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investment, water, hygiene and ICT, (2) agriculture and agricultural reforms for food stability, (3) in-
dustrial development, particularly industries that use local products such as fertilizer, cement, textiles, 
coal, iron and steel, and development of special economic zones through the utilization of private–
public partnership arrangements, (4) development of human capital and skills with a focus on science, 
technology and innovation, and (5) tourism, trade and financial services (POPC, 2011).
Professor Benno Ndullu (personal communication, March 21, 2012), Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania and the central figure in this plan, pointed out that the basic concept behind the Tanzania 
Five Year Development Plan is to use public investment wisely as a lever to invite private investment, 
continues:
We plan to build a logistics hub by this means. The Government will provide the land 
and the private sector will invest in the logistics hub. While the business environment 
has improved with the previous DAC approach to development aid, strategic areas have 
been neglected because of a lack of funds. Wise public investments will clear away these 
investment obstacles.
With Vision 2025 as its long- term development plan, Tanzania has been implementing the PRSP as its 
medium- term development plan. Furthermore, the Joint Aid Strategy for Tanzania clearly states that the 
Government and donors shall move ahead with development based on a single common aid strategy (the 
PRSP). Despite the existence of these plans, Tanzania established the Tanzania Five Year Development 
Plan on its own initiative. I asked Professor Benno Ndullu what donors thought of this move. He said, 
“DAC Donors are not pleased by this plan. But the fact is ODA is not flexible. If ODA can be directed 
into Tanzania’s strategic areas, it would be fine, but if it cannot, other investment is necessary to attract the 
private sector (personal communication, March 21, 2012).”
This testimony is vital to the analysis presented here. What is most intriguing is that ODA to date 
has been rigid and has neglected strategic fields for Tanzania’s growth—those in which improving 
the business environment in the country are central. Furthermore, the areas where DAC donors have 
been unable to contribute under the past PRSPs are exactly the strategic areas for economic growth 
that the Tanzanian Government wants. It is clear, then, that the new Tanzania Five Year Development 
Plan was established as a NDP to supersede the PRSP. This testimony is also consistent with the 
previously- mentioned grounds for the Tanzanian Government’s independent and secretive establish-
ment of a new NDP that kept donors out of the process. Professor Benno Ndullu had the following to 
say about the specific concepts behind the plan:
The Tanzania Five Year Development Plan established in June 2011 is a strategy doc-
ument for strategic national investment. To take advantage of our geographical advan-
tages, as Tanzania is the gateway to the inland districts, our aim is to accelerate growth 
through the enhancement of data services using optical fibre, the appropriate applica-
tion of resources and agriculture, the enhancement of port facilities, and the improve-
ment of our central railway corridor. We also hope to make Mtwara a growth base. This 
is because gas fields are present in the surrounding area and because it can be a base 
for manufacturing plants and exporting. We also plan on building a logistics hub as 
another base. This will necessitate upgrades to our port facilities, electrical power grid, 
and other infrastructure. Moreover, optical fibre network projects are critical to estab-
lishing a good business environment. And aid with gas pipelines is essential to stabilizing 
Tanzania’s power supply sector 
(personal communication, March 21, 2012).
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The plans set out above are exactly what China has tried to realize through the following projects 
and investment: the project to install an undersea optical fibre network, an iron ore production project 
in Liganga and Mchuchuma, Songo Songo gas production project, setting up a special economic zone, 
building a Logistic Department Centre for spare parts and an exhibition hall in Kurasini, 40 kilometres 
outside of the Dar es Salaam port and other road and railway projects.
Bank of Tanzania Governor Benno Ndullu, who is also the chairman of the Tanzania Five Year 
Development Plan Implementation Committee, spoke about Tanzania’s grand blueprint for ambitious 
growth. This strategy makes it clear that China has a huge role to play, as it has expanded aid in recent 
years in the strategic fields that to which DAC donors and others, who have been promoting develop-
ment aid centred on the social services sectors, have not been able to contribute. All China’s contribu-
tions underpin Tanzania’s future growth strategies, as contained in the Five Year Development Plan.
This section demonstrates that China’s recent expanding contributions dovetail perfectly with the 
concepts behind the Five Year Development Plan. Thus, Chinese contributions, especially in the fields 
of energy and transportation infrastructure, ICT, industrial development, development of special eco-
nomic zones and so forth, which Bank of Tanzania Governor mentioned, are an irreplaceable part 
of Tanzania’s approach to future economic growth. What this analysis suggests is that, although the 
Tanzanian Government’s and the DAC donors’ development strategies are essentially in agreement, 
the “development” the Tanzanian Government desires cannot be attained with DAC donors’ devel-
opment strategy, which is heavily slanted toward the social services sectors. In this sense, the two 
sides’ opinions diverge. In other words, in order to attain the “development” it wants, the Tanzanian 
Government, on its own initiative, independently formulated the Five Year Development Plan and 
channelled China’s contributions, a new resource, into strategic fields that DAC donors have largely 
neglected thus far. The Tanzanian Government has successfully incorporated China’s contributions 
without avoiding any damage to the relationship with the DAC donors, but with obtaining otherwise 
necessary justification to receive the new development resources.
The next section, in order to respond to the research question provided will follow the transitions 
in the National Planning Commission. It will show how the Tanzanian Government has established 
aid management systems in a way that conforms to the intentions of the donor. However, when the 
Tanzanian Government was confronted with a new aid system or new opportunity for receiving devel-
opment aid resources, the process was driven by the Tanzanian Government.
5 |  TRANSITIONS IN TANZANIA’S NATIONAL PLANNING 
ORGANIZATION FOR THE AID MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
An interview with the chief economist of the POPC, responsible to the Cabinet in all matters relating 
to the planning and management of the economy (personal communication, March 21, 2012), out-
lined how Tanzania’s planning committee has changed its organization, role and name over the years. 
According to him, there have been times when it was the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Planning 
and other times when it was consolidated with the Ministry of Finance. Since 2008, however, it has 
been part of the President’s Office.
The past 15 changes to the national planning organization have seen the Planning Commission 
placed under the President’s Office four times, in 1964, 1989, 2000 and 2008. These four changes 
were made in times that were important in terms of development aid. The year 1964, was, of course, 
the year Tanzania gained its independence and became a republic. The Development Planning 
Department was responsible for analyzing all proposals related to economic development, domestic 
and foreign government development, and community development and determining development 
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plans. The Planning Commission was placed under the President’s Office next in 1989. This was 
the year development aid soared to a point where the country’s aid dependency exceeded 20% of its 
gross domestic product (GDP), in the wake of introducing World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes in 1986. Amid the rising impact of development aid, 
the country placed the Planning Commission under the direct control of the President’s Office and 
gave the Commission sweeping powers. The move gave the Commission the authority to require all 
aid project proposals to be submitted to the Commission so that it could centrally manage all projects. 
This consolidation of power suggests the country tried to modify the impact of development aid and 
to unify access to development aid resources. It is clear from Paper 6 of the Planning Commission 
Act, 1989, that the Planning Commission, as the Government’s highest advisory body, had sweeping 
powers:
Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Decentralization Government 
Administration (Interim Provisions) Act, 1972, the Local Government (District 
Authorities) Act, 1982, the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act, 1982, and any 
other written laws relating to the organization and performance of the functions of the 
Government, the (Planning) Commission shall be the highest advisory body, responsible 
to the Cabinet, in all matters relating to the planning and management of the economy 
and for that purpose it shall have (the following powers).
Later, the Commission established the Tanzania Development Vision 2025. Vision 2025 is still re-
garded as the country’s long- term development plan. The year 2000 was important because it was the year 
the PRSP was established, which was critical to the poverty reduction regime’s formation. The chief econ-
omist of the President’s Office Planning Committee (personal communication, March 21, 2012) declared 
that the 1989 Act required all projects to pass through the Planning Commission, however, after various 
reforms, and the introduction of the PRSP, subsequently all projects had to pass through the Ministry of 
Finance.
With the progress of the poverty reduction regime’s formation process, and with the introduction of 
the PRSP and GBS, all projects began to be passed through the Ministry of Finance. This created a 
structure in which the Ministry of Finance had central control over all donor development aid, and 
formed mechanisms to efficiently obtain the resources represented by donor development aid. At the 
same time, the privatization of state- run enterprises, due to the introduction of PRSP, was unmistak-
ably a huge concern for the Tanzanian Government since privatization could have impacts on the finan-
cial resources of the Government.6 Consequently, the privatization function was added to the President’s 
Office Planning Committee for the purpose of privatizing the economy and state- run enterprises as 
well as harmonizing development investment policies and the implementation of export strategies. 
Then, in 2008, the planning department shifted again to the President’s Office, and the Tanzania Five 
Year Development Plan was created for the purposes of determining policies and strategies on long- 
term economic and social welfare targets and of monitoring the implementation of Government deci-
sions on economic management and planning. It is clear, from the statements of the chief economist 
(personal communication, March 21, 2012) that the Government was trying to centralize the manage-
ment of all projects at the President’s Office Planning Committee under the auspices of the Tanzania 
Five Year Development Plan while the Ministry of Finance continues to have jurisdiction over GBS.
6The first PRSP provided the platform for the privatization of large public corporations, such as Tanzania Telecommunications 
Company Limited (TTCL), Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC), Tanzania Electric Supply Company Limited (TANESCO), 
Tanzania Ports Authority (THA), National Bank of Commerce (NBC), etc.
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The chief economist (personal communication, March 21, 2012) stated:
DAC donors have MDGs, but the Government’s orientation is growth. The Five Year 
Development Plan focuses on infrastructure improvements, energy supplies, agriculture, 
human resource development, trade promotion, and financial services for economic 
growth. MKUKUTA II (the third PRSP), on the other hand, is a comprehensive strategy. 
The two are not in conflict. Rather, this arrangement lets donors continue to cooperate 
in order to implement MKUKUTA II while funds can be provided to projects included in 
the Five Year Development Plan.
We can read from this statement and the way that China’s contributions are incorporated into the 
Five Year Development Plan that the Government seems to be aware of the compartmentalized poli-
cies: the PRSP for DAC donors primarily to realize the MDGs, and the Five Year Development Plan, 
which encapsulates the Tanzanian Government’s growth focus. Evident from all this testimony is that, 
given a situation of high aid dependency and the necessity of relying on donors for development, the 
Tanzanian Government had to construct new mechanisms and management systems to absorb Chinese 
contributions, an enticing new resource, in order to break ground in strategic fields that will drive the 
growth the Government desires. However, China’s approach eschews the poverty reduction regime 
frameworks the Tanzanian Government had built with DAC donors. Thus, if the Government had not 
taken new measures, it would have proven difficult to incorporate China’s contributions. At the same 
time, development aid from DAC donors remains an essential resource for the kind of development 
sought by the Tanzanian Government and is a crucial strategy for poverty reduction. Therefore, along 
with DAC donor aid, the Government had to take in contributions from China, which exists outside 
the poverty reduction regime frameworks the Tanzanian Government had built with DAC donors, 
and who were in conflict with DAC donors over the growth of development aid based on the poverty 
reduction regime frameworks. If successful, the Government would be able simultaneously to pursue 
both resource acquisition and the development it wants through Tanzania- driven aid management. 
This framework is the Tanzania Five Year Development Plan, which the Tanzanian Government es-
tablished independently on its own initiative and is probably the reason why the PRSP continues to 
exist.
6 |  CONCLUSIONS
This article has attempted to clarify Government behaviours relating to the management of aid in 
Tanzania, where the poverty reduction regime is most advanced.
There are some conclusions that can be drawn from this article. The first conclusion is that, al-
though the Tanzanian Government’s and the DAC donors’ development strategies are essentially 
aligned, the “development” the Tanzanian Government desires cannot be attained solely with the 
development approach of the DAC donors, as it is heavily slanted toward the social services sectors. 
As a result, the Tanzanian Government, on its own initiative, independently formulated the Five Year 
Development Plan and channelled Chinese contributions, a new resource, into strategic fields that 
DAC donors have so far largely neglected. So, while poverty reduction strategies are definitely im-
portant to the Tanzanian Government, this article showed that the Tanzanian Government has simulta-
neously prioritized growth even though the Tanzanian Government appeared to share the same views 
and ideas as DAC donors in the poverty reduction regime. In this way, the Tanzanian Government 
could manage aid from both DAC donors and China.
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Next, this article analyzed, by means of tracking the transitions in Tanzania’s development plan-
ning commissions, how the Tanzanian Government has managed development aid. We find that the 
Tanzanian Government has learned valuable lessons through the transition process and constructed 
a management system that allows it to be more proactive in obtaining resources, while pursuing the 
development it desires. In 1989, when the POPC was given legal powers to unify all projects, the 
Government was also almost pushed into building this management system, as development aid bal-
looned to the point where the country’s aid dependency exceeded 20% of its GDP, as previously noted. 
After the Helleiner Report, the mechanisms that were built were more donor- driven than anything 
else.
However, the Government studied the donors’ concepts and approaches during the process of es-
tablishing the Strategy for Tanzania with donors. The Ministry of Finance gradually began to claim 
ownership of the process and exerted pressure to construct more proactive mechanisms. During this 
period, frameworks were constructed in which the Ministry of Finance centrally managed all aid 
projects. Later, when the Planning Commission was moved under the President’s Office in 2008, the 
Government chose to build government- driven mechanisms that incorporated new resources, while 
retaining the previous mechanisms, over the donor- driven architecture of previous mechanisms and 
frameworks. Thus, we can say that the Tanzanian Government, although it had modified the man-
agement system in the past to match donors’ development intentions, constructed a management 
system that can simultaneously maximize resource acquisition and pursue the development it desires 
more proactively than before, based on the lessons learned while formulating the poverty reduction 
regime.
In addition, this article demonstrates that Tanzania is a country with significant ability to man-
age aid and the receipt of development aid resources, despite being considered a passive donor- 
driven recipient. This result supported the hypothesis presented in section 2 and shows that the 
Tanzania Government has managed international aid in a recipient- driven manner. This conclusion 
is important for considering about SDGs because more actors are expected to be engaged and this 
result shows that recipient countries will potentially manage to acquire future new resources under 
SDGs.
Finally, this article will conclude with some remarks about possible future studies. This article 
examined Government behaviours as to how to manage aid in Tanzania through broad interviews 
and documents. However, there is room for further investigation to substantiate make the thesis 
posited in this article, though this research method is the all that is available at this moment. 
Another point is that this article did not examine the actual aid allocation after receiving aid 
resources. Furthermore, it is not clear that the aid provided by both DAC donors and China has 
effectively reached people on the ground. This kind of analysis should be considered for future 
studies.
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